1. Monetary policy advice 1.1. Determinacy. A fundamental issue in the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules is the question of whether a proposed policy rule is associated with a determinate equilibrium or not. Starting with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1975) , it has been shown that certain types of policy rules may be associated with large sets of rational expectations equilibria (REE) and that some of these equilibria may involve fluctuations in variables like inflation and real output due solely to self-fulfilling expectations. Such rules and the associated equilibria arguably ought to be avoided if one wishes to stabilize these variables. 1 Perhaps disconcertingly, this problem appears to be particularly acute for policy rules which may otherwise seem to be fairly realistic in terms of actual central bank behavior. For example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) have provided evidence which suggests that monetary policy for the major industrialized countries since 1979 has been forward-looking: Nominal interest rates are adjusted in response to anticipated inflation.
This empirical finding is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact that such forward-looking rules are associated with equilibrium indeterminacy in many models (see, in particular, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) ). Similarly, in many models policy rules which call for the monetary authority to respond aggressively to past values of endogenous variables (such as the previous quarter's deviations of inflation from a target level, or the output gap)
can be associated with explosive instability of rational expectations equilibrium. Yet at the same time, such policy rules might also be viewed as fairly realistic in terms of actual central bank behavior in some contexts. Thus, at least two empirically relevant and seemingly ordinary-looking classes of policy rules seem to be associated with important theoretical problems.
These theoretical concerns impinge on the design of stabilization policy. Even aside from broad modeling uncertainty, there is considerable sampling variability about the estimated parameters of a given model of the macroeconomy. When a candidate class of policy rules may or may not generate indeterminacy, or explosive instability, depending on the particular parameter values of the structural model and of the policy rule, it creates something of a minefield for policy design. 2 One might, for instance, recommend a particular rule on the basis that it would generate a determinate rational expectations 1 Some of the authors that discuss this issue most recently include Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) , Christiano and Gust (1999) , Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) , McCallum and Nelson (1999) , Woodford (1998, 1999) , and Woodford (2003) . 2 See, for example, the discussion in Christiano and Gust (1999) .
equilibrium, and that the targeted equilibrium would have desirable properties based on other criteria, such as utility of the representative household in the model. And yet, in reality, important parameters may lie (because of sampling variability alone) in a region associated with indeterminacy of equilibrium, or with explosive instability. Actually implementing the proposed rule could then lead to disastrous consequences. Thus, from the perspective of the design of stabilization policy, one would greatly prefer to recommend policy rules such that, even if the structural parameters actually take on values somewhat different from those that might be estimated, a determinate rational expectations equilibrium is produced.
Learnability. Even when a determinate equilibrium exists, coordination on that
equilibrium cannot be assured if agents do not possess rational expectations at every point in time.
It therefore seems important to analyze these systems when agents must form expectations concerning economic events using the actual data produced by the economy.
In general terms, the learning approach admits the possibility that expectations might not initially be fully rational, and that, if economic agents make forecast errors and try to correct them over time, the economy may or may not reach the REE asymptotically.
Thus, beyond showing that a particular policy rule reliably induces a determinate REE, one needs to show the potential for agents to learn that equilibrium. 3 In this paper,
we assume the agents of the model do not initially have rational expectations, and that they instead form forecasts by using recursive learning algorithms-such as recursive least squares-based on the data produced by the economy itself. We ask whether the agents in such a world can learn the equilibria of the system induced by different classes of monetary policy feedback rules. We use the criterion of expectational stability (a.k.a. E-stability)
to calculate whether rational expectations equilibria are stable under real time recursive learning dynamics or not. The research of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Marcet and Sargent (1989) has shown that the expectational stability of rational expectations equilibrium governs local convergence of real time recursive learning algorithms in a wide variety of macroeconomic models.
The benefits of monetary policy inertia. We conclude that it is important
to recommend to central banks those policy rules which have desirable determinacy and learnability properties, taking into consideration possible imprecision in our knowledge of structural parameters. Our main finding is that a wide variety of monetary policy rules are desirable in this sense provided the monetary authorities move cautiously in response to unfolding events. This is true both from the point of view of determinacy and of learnability of equilibrium. We model this caution, or inertia, on the part of the central bank by allowing the contemporaneous interest rate to respond to the lagged interest rate in the policy rule.
Inertia is a well-documented feature of central bank behavior in industrialized countries: Policymakers show a clear tendency to smooth out changes in nominal interest rates in response to changes in economic conditions. Rudebusch (1995) has provided one statistical analysis of this fact. More casually, actual policy moves are discussed among central bankers and in the business press in industrialized countries as occurring as sequences of adjustments in nominal interest rates in the same direction. This is so much the case, in fact, that policy inertia has been the source of criticism of the efforts of central bankers, as suggestions are sometimes made that policymakers have been unwilling to move far enough or fast enough to respond effectively to incoming information about the economy.
Our study provides analytical support for the idea that monetary policy inertia enhances the prospects for equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the context of a standard, small, forward-looking model which is currently the workhorse for the study of monetary policy rules. More specifically, we consider two variants of monetary policy feedback rules made famous by the seminal work of Taylor (1993, 1999a, 1999b) . In one case, the central bank is viewed as adjusting a short-term nominal interest rate in response to deviations of past values of inflation and output from some target levels and, in order to capture interest rate smoothing, we also include a response to the deviation of the lagged interest rate from some target level. We call this the lagged data specification. Our second specification calls for the policymakers to react to forecasts of inflation deviations and the output gap, in addition to the lagged interest rate, and we call this the forward-looking specification. 4 In previous studies it has been observed that there are important determinacy problems with both of these rules in the absence of inertia (see Bernanke and Woodford (1997) , Bullard and Mitra (2002) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) , and Woodford (2003)). We find that by placing a sufficiently large weight on lagged interest rate deviations in each of these classes of policy rules, the policy authorities can mitigate the threats of indeterminacy or explosive instability, and that this is one of the primary benefits of monetary policy inertia. We also argue that policy inertia actually promotes learnability of rational expectations equilibrium. Our contribution is to provide analytical results to this effect and to highlight some of the intuition behind them. consider models where the timing of money balances entering the utility function and the nature of sticky price assumption along off-equilibrium paths is important. They find that inertial forward looking policies are subject to indeterminacy problems whereas backward policies which react aggressively to past inflation can be associated with a determinate equilibrium independently of the degree of inertia.
1.5. Organization. In the next section we present the model analyzed throughout the paper. We also discuss the types of linear policy feedback rules we will use to organize our analysis, and a calibrated case which we will occasionally employ. In the subsequent sections, we present conditions for determinacy of equilibrium for the lagged and forward looking policy rules. We then turn to the question of learnability of REE under our various specifications. Section 5 considers the robustness of our results in Preston's (2005a) model.
We conclude with a summary of our findings.
Environment
2.1. The model. We study a model developed by Woodford (2003) which we write as
where x t is the output gap, π t is the period t inflation rate defined as the percentage change in the price level from t − 1 to t, and r t is the nominal interest rate; each of the two latter variables are expressed as a deviation from the long run level. Since we will also analyze learning we use the notationÊ t π t+1 andÊ t x t+1 to denote the possibly nonrational private sector expectations of inflation and output gap next period, respectively, whereas the same notation without the hat symbol will denote rational expectations (RE) values. 6 The parameters σ, κ, and β ∈ (0, 1) are structural and assumed positive on economic groundssee Woodford (1999, 2003) for an interpretation of these constants. The "natural rate of interest" r n t is an exogenous stochastic term that follows the process
where t is i.i.d. noise with variance σ 2 , and 0 ≤ ρ < 1 is a serial correlation parameter.
2.2. Alternative policy rules. We close the system by supplementing equations (1), (2) , and (3), which represent the behavior of the private sector, with a policy rule 6 See Section 5 for more discussion of the role of expectations in the model under a learning assumption.
for setting the nominal interest rate representing the behavior of the monetary authority.
We stress that we view identification of classes of rules that reliably produce determinacy and learnability as a prior exercise to locating an optimal rule according to some objective function assigned to the central bank. Once we isolate the characteristics of rules that reliably produce both determinacy and learnability, then one could go about finding an optimal or best-performing rule from among the ones in this set.
Taylor (1993, 1999a) popularized the use of interest rate feedback rules that react to information on output and inflation. Our first specification considers a case in which interest rates are adjusted in response to last quarter's observations on inflation and the output gap. This is our lagged data specification for our interest rate equation
This specification is considered operational by McCallum (1999) since it does not call for the central bank to react to contemporaneous data on output and inflation deviations.
Our second specification assumes that the authorities set their interest rate instrument in response to their forecasts of output gap and inflation, so that the policy rule itself is forward-looking. Forward-looking rules have been found to describe well the actual behavior of monetary policymakers in countries like Germany, Japan, and the U.S. since 1979, as documented by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998). We consider a simple version of this rule, namely
In the next section, we consider the determinacy of REE, and then we follow that with a section analyzing the learnability of equilibrium. We maintain the following assumptions throughout the paper: ϕ π ≥ 0 and ϕ x ≥ 0, with at least one strictly positive, ϕ r > 0, κ > 0, σ > 0, and 0 < β < 1. We sometimes illustrate our findings using Woodford's (1999) calibrated values, namely, β = .99, σ −1 = .157, κ = .024, and ρ = .35.
Inertia and determinacy
3.1. Lagged data in the policy rule. We start by considering the system when the policymaker reacts to lagged values of inflation, output, and interest rate deviations. 7 Similar interest rate rules also arise in the context of implementing optimal discretionary monetary policies and nominal GDP targeting, see respectively Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and Mitra (2003) . One interpretation for this rule is that both policymakers and private agents have homogeneous expectations and learning algorithms. Alternately, it may be that the central bank simply targets the predictions of private sector forecasters. However, one can allow for some forms of heterogeneity in learning rules, see Mitra (2005a, 2005b) .
Non-inertial lagged data rules (that is, rules with ϕ r = 0) can easily lead to non-existence of locally unique stationary solutions. Indeed, Bullard and Mitra (2002) note that a sufficiently aggressive response to inflation and output deviations invariably leads to such a situation in quantitatively important portions of the parameter space. 8 We now show that this problem need not arise if the central bank displays sufficient inertia in setting its interest rate.
In this case, our policy rule is given by equation (4), so that the complete system is given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). If y t = (x t , π t , r t ) 0 , then this system can be put in the formÊ t y t+1 = B 1 y t + ςr n t , where
Since r t is predetermined while x t and π t are free, equilibrium is determinate if and only if exactly one eigenvalue of B 1 is inside the unit circle. 
[κσ + 2(
The condition (7) is precisely what Woodford (2001 Woodford ( , 2003 calls the Taylor principle, whereby in the event of a permanent one percent rise in inflation, the cumulative increase in the nominal interest rate is more than one percent. However, the Taylor principle in general is not sufficient for determinacy, because another necessary condition for determinacy is condition (8) . This proves the following result:
interest rule (4) . Then a necessary condition for determinacy is
This proposition shows that the Taylor principle is not sufficient for determinacy, since it is also necessary that the degree of inertia ϕ r be large enough. If the central bank merely responds vigorously to inflation and output without displaying enough inertia, then the condition for determinacy may be violated.
Appendix A also shows that a set of necessary and sufficient conditions required for determinacy reduce to (7), (8) , and
The right hand expression in (10) is less than 1 since κ > 0, σ > 0, and 0 < β < 1. These conditions show that a large enough value of ϕ r will always result in determinacy since this contributes to satisfaction of all of the conditions (7), (8), and (10) . A value of ϕ r ≥ 1 always satisfies (7) and (10), so that if ϕ r also satisfies condition (8), the conditions for determinacy will be met. Hence, this proves:
Assume that ϕ r ≥ 1 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (4). Then the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is
The analytical results given above provide intuition for a number of results obtained in more complicated forward-looking models. For instance, Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) found that large values of ϕ r tend to be associated with a unique equilibrium. This is easily explained by conditions (7), (8 (5), we define y t = (x t , π t , r t−1 ) 0 and put the system in the formÊ t y t+1 = By t + ςr n t , where
Since r t−1 is pre-determined and x t , π t are free, equilibrium is determinate if and only if exactly one eigenvalue of B is inside the unit circle. As shown in Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Bullard and Mitra (2002) , a sufficiently aggressive response to inflation or output leads to indeterminacy with the rule (5) when ϕ r = 0. We now turn to showing how this problem can be circumvented when policymakers adopt a sufficiently aggressive response to the lagged interest rate.
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The first proposition shows that if the response to the output gap ϕ x is not large, then necessary conditions for determinacy are given by conditions (7) and (8). More specifically, Proposition 3. Assume that ϕ x < 2σ −1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5).
Then conditions (7) and (8) are necessary for determinacy.
12
This again shows that the Taylor principle in general is not sufficient for determinacy, as a high degree of inertia is also necessary. In addition, we have Proposition 4. Assume that ϕ r ≥ 1 for the inertial forward looking policy rule (5) .
Then the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is (8).
The same proposition was proved for rules responding to lagged data (Proposition 2). These results show that for given values of ϕ π and ϕ x , a large enough value of ϕ r is invariably associated with determinacy.
Summary of the results on determinacy.
We have seen the beneficial effects of a large degree of inertia in promoting determinacy for the lagged data rule and the forward looking rule. We stress that the same cannot be said for the response to inflation or output in the interest rule-a response which is too aggressive with respect to either of these variables may lead to problems of non-existence of stationary REE, or to indeterminacy of REE. The tendency of policy inertia to help generate determinacy may be an important reason why so much inertia is observed in the actual monetary policies of industrialized countries. However, too much policy inertia may cause another type of instability-that of the learning dynamics. We now turn to this topic.
Inertia and learnability
4.1. Lagged data in the policy rule.
The system under learning. We now consider learning, beginning with the case in which the policy authority responds to lagged data. 13 In this case, the complete system is given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (4). We analyze the expectational stability of stationary minimum state variable (MSV) solutions (see McCallum (1983) ). For the analysis of learning, we need to compute the MSV solution and for this we need to obtain a relationship between the current endogenous variables (and their lags) and future expectations. This relationship is now obtained by first defining the vector of endogenous variables, y t = (x t , π t , r t ) 0 , and by putting our system in the form y t = ΩÊ t y t+1 + δy t−1 + κr n t where
The MSV solution for this model takes the form y t =ā +by t−1 +cr n t (15) withā = 0, and withb andc given bȳ
provided the matrix (I − Ωb) is invertible. Equation (16) potentially yields multiple solutions forb and the determinate case corresponds to the situation when there is a unique solution forb with all eigenvalues inside the unit circle. For the analysis of learning, we assume that agents have a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
corresponding to the MSV solution. We then compute the following expectation (assuming that the time t information set does not include y t )
Substituting these computed expectations into the model one obtains an actual law of motion (ALM)
The mapping from the PLM to the ALM takes the form
Expectational stability is then determined by the matrix differential equation
The fixed points of equation (22) give us the MSV solution (ā,b,c). We say that a particular MSV solution (ā,b,c) is expectationally stable if the MSV fixed point of the differential equation (22) is locally asymptotically stable at that point. Our system is in a form where we can apply the results of Evans and Honkapohja (2001) . It can then be shown that for E -stability of any MSV solution, assuming that the time t information set is (1, y 0 t−1 , r n t ) 0 , the eigenvalues of the matrices
need to have negative real parts (where I denotes a conformable identity matrix). If any eigenvalue of the above matrices has a positive real part, then the MSV solution is not E -stable. Even small expectational errors would tend to drive the system away from the REE. We emphasize that the MSV solution forb directly affects the E -stability conditions and this is the key to understanding the results under learning.
A quantitative case. We illustrate regions of determinacy and E -stability for the case when the policy authorities react to lagged data in Figure 1 where we have employed the baseline parameter values. Figure 1 contains three panels, the first of which corresponds to the case where there is no policy inertia, so that ϕ r = 0. The figure is drawn in (ϕ π , ϕ x ) space, holding all other parameters at their baseline values. Vertical lines in the figure denote parameter combinations that generate determinacy, and that also generate local stability in the learning dynamics. Horizontal lines, on the other hand, Figure 1 : With ϕ r = 0, the region of the parameter space associated with both determinate and learnable rational exepectations equilibria involves relatively small values for ϕ x , and generally ϕ π > 1. In the blank region, determinacy does not hold. When ϕ r = .65, which is close to empirical estimates in the literature, the region of the parameter space associated with determinacy and learnability expands, relative to the no inertia case. For a large value of ϕ r , such as ϕ r = 5 as shown here, much of the pictured (ϕ π , ϕ x ) space is associated with both determinacy and learnability.
indicate parameter combinations that generate determinacy, but where the unique equilibrium is unstable in the learning dynamics. In this and all figures, the blank region is not associated with determinacy.
The ϕ r = 0 portion of this figure illustrates that determinacy does not always imply learnability. It also illustrates that Taylor-type rules which react aggressively to inflation, but with little or no reaction to the output gap or the lagged interest rate, tend to be associated with both determinacy and learnability. However, one concern regarding this panel might be that parameter values within an empirically relevant range are sometimes associated with equilibria which are not determinate, or which are determinate but not learnable.
The second panel of Figure 1 illustrates how the situation is improved when the degree of monetary policy inertia is increased from zero to ϕ r = .65. This value is close to estimates of the degree of policy inertia based on U.S. postwar data, such as Sack (1998).
In this case, the region of the (ϕ π , ϕ x ) space associated with both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium has been enlarged. The region associated with determinate, but unlearnable, rational expectations equilibria has been eliminated. This effect becomes even more pronounced in the third panel, where a very large value of ϕ r is employed, specifically, ϕ r = 5. In this case, a much larger portion of the space is determinate and learnable. We conclude that larger degrees of policy inertia enhance the prospects for determinacy considerably, relative to the case where there is no policy inertia at all, in this quantitative case. In addition, learnability does not appear to be jeopardized by large degrees of policy inertia, as the determinate equilibria are also learnable, even when ϕ r is large.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1 . We begin with a discussion of non-inertial, ϕ r = 0, policy rules. The triangular region in the left hand panel of Figure 1 shows that there are determinate equilibria which are E -unstable in this case. We first provide intuition for this phenomenon. When ϕ r = 0, the reduced form model with the interest rate rule (4) takes the form y t = ΩÊ t y t+1 + δy t−1 + κr n t with
where
The MSV solution continues to take the form (15) with the same solutions forā (= 0), andb,c given by (16) and (17) . It is the feedback from lagged endogenous variables (viab) in the stationary MSV solution that is the key to understanding E -instability of determinate equilibria.
In matrix form, the MSV solution forb is of the form
, and b xx and b ππ can be computed from equation (16); see Appendix B. Written explicitly, this MSV solution takes the form
Here the three elipses denote terms involving shocks not needed for our analysis. We conclude thatb in (27) is singular, and that |b xx + b ππ | < 1 is required for stationarity of the MSV solutionb.
We first provide an economic interpretation of E -stability. The nature of the MSV solution is crucial for E -stability since we start the system not at the REE but from within a small neighborhood of the REE of interest. If b xx and b ππ are positive (so that b xπ and b πx are positive as well), then the MSV solution (28)- (29) has a perverse feature. This feature is that while an increase in either lagged output or inflation raises the nominal interest rate, the increase in the nominal interest rate is not large enough (i.e., the real interest rate falls). Consequently, current output and inflation actually increase which further enhances inflationary pressures if one starts away from the REE. If, on the other hand, agents do have rational expectations, then their beliefs will exactly match realizations and this equilibrium will be the unique one in this parameter range. It is only when agents do not have RE to start with that there will be pressure to move further away from these determinate REE owing to the perverse nature of the solution. Dynamics along off-equilibrium paths is important for E -stability but not for determinacy.
We now turn to the analytical details behind E -stability. To examine what type of MSV solutions can be E -stable, we first note that a necessary condition for E -stability is that the eigenvalues of Ω + Ωb − I have negative real parts and for this, the determinant of Ω + Ωb − I, given by
must be positive. This shows that it is necessary for at least one of b xx or b ππ to be negative for E -stability since otherwise this determinant will be negative. In other words, if both b xx and b ππ are positive, the MSV solution will necessarily be E -unstable verifying the economic intuition outlined above.
This is precisely what happens in the triangular determinate but E -unstable region of Figure 1 . This region corresponds to the violation of the Taylor principle and the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy in this case is given by condition (55)
in Proposition 11 (but with ϕ r = 0 for this discussion). It can be easily checked that the unique stationary solution forb in this region involves b xx > 0 and b ππ > 0 which makes this solution E -unstable. As long as ϕ r is sufficiently small, the existence of a determinate equilibrium does not preclude a solution forb with both b xx and b ππ positive. As a result, a triangular determinate but E -unstable region continues to exist for small ϕ r ; however the size of this region shrinks as ϕ r increases eventually being eliminated.
The determinate and E -stable region when ϕ r = 0, on the other hand, satisfies the Taylor principle and it can be checked numerically that these regions are characterized by MSV solutions where b xx and b ππ (and hence b xπ and b πx ) are all negative. In these solutions, an increase in either lagged output or inflation increases both the nominal and the real interest rate so that contemporaneous output and inflation fall pushing the economy back towards the initial equilibrium even when agents start outside the REE and are learning using recursive least squares.
When the policy rule involves ϕ r > 0, the MSV solutionb takes the form
with
are known, the remaining unknowns can be determined from them numerically. Written explicitly the MSV solution is of the form
where the interest rate rule in the MSV solution is (4). A necessary condition for Ω+Ωb−I
to have eigenvalues with negative real parts (that is, for E -stability) is that a 2 , defined as will be insufficiently large, actually raising future inflation and output further worsening these inflationary pressures. This in turn would raise expectations of inflation and output gap of private agents further increasing inflation and pushing the economy away from the REE, even if initially agents had started from a small neighborhood of this REE.
We emphasize that this intuition is relevant for low levels of monetary policy inertia.
The situation changes markedly when the degree of inertia is large. It is easy to check that two of the eigenvalues ofb in (31) at the MSV solution are zero and the third one is
given
Without any further calculations, the right hand inequality in (35) immediately demonstrates that if ϕ r ≥ 1, a necessary condition for stationarity is that at least one of b xr or b πr (i.e., b xx or b ππ ) be negative. Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 6. Assume that ϕ r ≥ 1. A necessary condition for an MSV solution with the lagged data interest rule (4) to be stationary is that either b xr < 0 or b πr < 0.
In other words, a high degree of inertia precludes a stationary MSV solution with both b xr and b πr positive. Earlier, we saw that for a small degree of inertia, determinate equilibria with positive values of both b xr and b πr satisfying (35) existed. These solutions were E -unstable by Proposition 5. We conclude that it is only with a high degree of inertia that the necessary conditions for both determinacy and E -stability coincide.
Imposing more conditions in the high inertia case enables us to provide a necessary and sufficient condition for E -stability below. One can check numerically that super-inertial rules (that is, rules with ϕ r ≥ 1) lead to determinate MSV solutions with both b xr and b πr
negative. 14 Appendix D shows that if the degree of inertia is large enough, the necessary and sufficient condition for E -stability simplifies to the one given in the following:
Assume that ϕ r ≥ 1 for the lagged interest rule (4) and consider a stationary MSV solution (i.e., one satisfying (35)) with b xr < 0 and b πr < 0. Let σϕ x + (β + κσ − 1)ϕ π ≥ 0 and
Then if ϕ r ≥ Max{β + κσ, ϕ + r }, the necessary and sufficient condition for E-stability is
We stress that b xr < 0 and b πr < 0 per se do not suffice for condition (37) to be satisfied. As it turns out, numerically, the determinate MSV solutions with super-inertial rules satisfy condition (37) and all such solutions are E -stable. In other words, an increase in interest rate should exert a strong dampening influence on inflation and output to reduce inflationary pressures in the economy and enable a return to the REE of interest.
Forward expectations in the policy rule.
The system under learning. With forward expectations the complete system is given by equations (1), (2), (3), and (5). We analyze E -stability of the MSV solution.
After defining the vector of endogenous variables, y t = (x t , π t , r t ) 0 , we put our system in the form y t = ΩÊ t y t+1 + δy t−1 + κr n t , where Ω and δ are given by
The MSV solutions take the same form (15) as in the case of lagged data, and the analysis of learning is also the same. Hence, assuming that the time t information set is A quantitative case. Figure 2 illustrates how, even for this case where the policymakers are reacting to expectations of future inflation deviations and output gaps, policy inertia tends to enhance the prospects for determinacy and learnability of a REE.
For low values of ϕ r , such as the value ϕ r = 0.1 in the first panel, we again find that 15 We note that β +κσ > 1, which suffices for σϕ x +(β +κσ−1)ϕ π ≥ 0, is generally satisfied for plausible values of structural parameters since the discount factor β is close to 1 (including the baseline values). In addition, for the baseline values, ϕ + r = 1.48. We conjecture that the condition ϕ r ≥ Max{β + κσ, ϕ + r } can be weakened. active Taylor-type rules with little or no reaction to other variables are associated with both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium. However, the large region in the figure which is not associated with determinacy might be enough to limit recommendations of such rules because of uncertainty about parameter values. The second and third panels of Figure 2 show that increased policy inertia can mitigate such concerns, creating a larger region of determinacy, and in addition, that in these cases determinate equilibria are also learnable.
Intuition and analytics. We now provide some intuition and analytics for the phenomena illustrated in Figure 2 . As before, it is the MSV solution forb which is crucial for E -stability. To gain further understanding, we first explore the type of stationary solutions permissible. Since it is only the lagged interest rate which appears in the model, the MSV solutions written explicitly take the form
where b x , b π , and b r are to be determined by solving the system of equations (16) 
We first consider a necessary condition for an MSV solution to be E -stable which is proved in Appendix F. This intuition is similar to that associated with the lagged data rule.
As in the case of lagged data, we examine the type of MSV solutions that can be stationary and compare them with the E -stability conditions. The following proposition is proved in Appendix E. 
In other words, even with a high degree of inertia, a stationary MSV solution is a priori Then if ϕ r ≥ Max{1, β + κσ}, the determinate equilibria are E-stable.
The intuition behind this result follows from our discussion. A high degree of inertia forces the determinate MSV solution to have the property that b π < 0, b x < 0, and 0 < b r < 1 which results in E -stability. 16 4.3. Alternative policy rules. Increasing the degree of monetary policy inertia appears to also be associated with learnability of rational expectations equilibrium in our setting. We considered only two types of (albeit plausible) interest rate rules primarily because of space constraints. However, similar results extend to other rules not reported
here. In particular, this is true for rules responding to contemporaneous values of inflation, output, and the lagged interest rate as well as to contemporaneous expectations of inflation and output and the lagged interest rate-in either case, a high degree of inertia results in E-stability of the determinate REE. 17 
The infinite horizon model
It has been standard in the learning literature since Marcet and Sarget (1989) to replace rational expectations agents with adaptive learners. In this paper we follow this standard, taking Woodford's basic two equations for output and inflation under rational expectations (RE) and replacing RE by arbitrary subjective expectations in equations (1) This is an interesting contribution, and we now turn to a discussion of how our results concerning inertia might be affected by taking this alternative viewpoint on bounded rationality. Preston (2005a) shows that his model can be reduced to the following two equations for output and inflation
To these equations, one can adjoin an equation for the interest rate rule such as (4) or (5).
We will conduct our analysis for the model (46) and (47) using the forward looking rule, (5), for illustrative purposes. For simplicity, we also assume that r n t is i.i.d. The MSV solution for the model continues to be of the form (15) . Agents estimate a linear model y t = a t + b t y t−1 + c t r n t + t as before, where y t = (x t , π t , r t ) 0 , t is the error term, and a t , b t , and c t are estimated from actual data. For the E -stability analysis, we may assume the estimated parameters to be time independent so that the PLM continues to be of the form (18) where
Agents compute the forecasts required in (46) and (47) by the following formula (T ≥ t+1)
Using these forecasts, the ALM can be computed as
where the coefficients in (50) are defined in Appendix G. The parameters a, b, c in the PLM (18) are mapped into the parameters X a , X b , and X c in the ALM (50) and the fixed points of this map correspond to the MSV solution. The mapping from the PLM to the ALM can be analyzed for E -stability as before.
There are two scenarios which can be considered as discussed in Preston (2005b) . The first scenario is where agents know the policy rule (5) and use this rule to form forecasts. There is an alternative scenario which can be considered as discussed in Preston (2005b) . This is the case where agents do not know (understand) the interest rate rule (5) and accordingly form forecasts of the interest rate from their PLM. The output gap equation in this case is given by (119) and the whole system by (120) in Appendix G. The results now change dramatically. Inertia is no longer sufficient to guarantee E -stability.
One has E -instability even with large degrees of inertia. These results are similar in flavor to those in Preston (2005b) . He too finds that certain forecast-based interest rules lead to E -stability when agents are endowed with knowledge of the policy rule and to E -instability when agents do not have this knowledge. As Preston discusses in some detail, this points to the virtues of transparency in policy formulation which has been emphasized in the recent literature of monetary policy.
Conclusion
Two key issues for the evaluation of monetary policy rules are whether they induce a determinate rational expectations equilibrium or not, and whether that equilibrium is learnable or not. We provide analytical results which indicate how an increased degree of interest rate smoothing may induce both determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibrium in a widely-used model of monetary policy. This is true across both of our specifications of monetary policy rules-a finding which we believe substantially alters the evaluation of these rules. Consequently, neither of these classes of policy rules-which might be considered particularly realistic in terms of actual central bank behavior-should be deemed undesirable on account of determinacy or learnability questions, once policy inertia is taken into account. First, note that the characteristic polynomial of B 1 (given in (6)), p(λ), is given by
Conditions (C.13) and (C.14) in Woodford (2003) are necessary for both Cases II and III (and they also rule out Case I). These two conditions are that p(1) > 0 and p(−1) < 0, which reduce to (7) and (8) in the text. This proves Proposition 1.
The conditions required for Case III of Woodford are (C.13), (C.14), and (C.17), i.e.,
The final condition corresponds to (10) since
iff condition (10) holds. This supplies the details behind Proposition 2.
We also state a proposition (without proof) which provides the required conditions for determinacy when the degree of inertia is low.
Proposition 11. Assume that κ(ϕ π + ϕ r − 1) + (1 − β)ϕ x < 0 for the inertial lagged data interest rule (4) . Then the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is
Note that condition (55) represents violation of condition (9) in Proposition 1. In particular, it can be shown that if ϕ r = 0, the necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is given by 18 ( π b ππ so that this system can be reduced to two (nonlinear) equations in two unknowns which can be solved numerically. In general, there are three solutions forb of which exactly one is stationary in the determinate region. 
where E ≡ ϕ r − (κϕ π + ϕ x )b xr − {βϕ π + σ(κϕ π + ϕ x )}b πr .
APPENDIX D (E -stability of Inertial Lagged Data Rule)
19 . The matrix Ω + Ωb − I has one eigenvalue of −1, and the remaining two are given by solutions to η 2 + ηa 1 + a 2 = 0, where
Hence, the necessary and sufficient conditions for Ω + Ωb − I to have eigenvalues with negative real parts are that a 1 > 0 and a 2 > 0. We next look at the 9 × 9 matrix
Using Mathematica, one can verify that five of the eigenvalues are −1 and two of the remaining four are given by solutions to
where the right-hand equality above uses the expression (59). We conclude that a 1 > 0 implies that the eigenvalues (61) are negative, as required for E -stability. The final two eigenvalues ofb 0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ωb − I are given by the solution of η 2 + ηc 1 + c 2 = 0, where
For E -stability we require c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0. We finally look at the matrix ρΩ + Ωb − I which has one eigenvalue equal to −1 and the remaining two given by the solutions to η 2 + ηa 1ρ + a 2ρ = 0, where
and for E -stability we require both a 1ρ > 0 and a 2ρ > 0. The right hand equality in (66) uses the expression for a 1 from (59) which, therefore, shows that a 1 > 0 implies that a 1ρ > 0 (since 0 < ρ < 1). In summary, the necessary and sufficient conditions for E -stability given in (23), (24), and (25) reduce to the coefficients a 1 , a 2 , c 1 , c 2 , and a 2ρ all being positive.
Details for Proposition 7. We first note that
where the right hand inequality in (68) follows from the solution being stationary and ϕ r ≥ 1, i.e., (the right hand inequality in) condition (35). Hence, ϕ r ≥ 1 implies that a 1 > a 2 from (68) and hence a 2 > 0 implies a 1 > 0. Similarly, comparing term by term, it can be checked that a 2ρ > a 2 since b xr < 0, b πr < 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. So a 2 > 0 also implies that a 2ρ > 0. The required necessary and sufficient conditions for E -stability have now reduced to a 2 > 0, c 1 > 0, and c 2 > 0. We now examine c 2 . Since ϕ r > 0, the sign of c 2 is determined by the expression within parentheses in (64). The first two terms within this parentheses can be combined together as
We show that the expression (69) is positive since each of the individual terms in parentheses on the right hand side of (69) is negative. The first term, β(ϕ x b xr + ϕ π b πr ), in (69) is negative by condition (35) when ϕ r ≥ 1. The second term in (69) is also negative since
where the final inequality in (70) again uses (35). The inequalities b xr < 0 and b πr < 0 then imply that the final three terms within the parentheses in (64) are positive. Hence, a sufficient condition for c 2 > 0 is that g(ϕ r ) ≡ βϕ 2 r − (1 + β + κσ)ϕ r + 1 ≥ 0. Since g(0) > 0 and g(1) < 0, g(ϕ r ) = 0 has two positive roots, one between 0 and 1, and the other more than 1. The root exceeding one is given by
In addition, g(ϕ r ) > 0 for all ϕ r > ϕ 
where the final inequality uses condition (35). Using this we can conclude the following about the expression within the parentheses of c 1
If σϕ x + (β + κσ − 1)ϕ π ≥ 0 and ϕ r ≥ β + κσ, then the above expression is negative provided b xr < 0 and b πr < 0. This proves that c 1 > 0. The only remaining condition required is a 2 > 0 which is given in the proposition. is given by (43). The first two equations (which can be verified using Mathematica) are
These two equations yield the following simultaneous system in b x and b π :
One can solve for b x in terms of b π from equation (77) which yields
and substituting equation (78) We next examine what type of MSV solutions can be stationary with the forward rule. Stationarity requires that |b r | < 1. 20 We consider three mutually exclusive cases for stationarity, namely 
Note that condition (82) cannot a priori be ruled out for a stationary MSV solution even when ϕ r ≥ 1. The final case, condition (81), is permissible only when at least one of b x or b π is negative at the MSV solution. In addition, b x ϕ x + b π ϕ π < 0 implies that b r > 0 from (43) and stationarity is equivalent to the requirement that
These results are collected in Proposition 9.
Details for the case when ϕ x = 0. When ϕ x = 0, we substitute (78) into (76) and the cubic polynomial in b π simplifies to
so that p(1 − ϕ r ) > 0 for all ϕ r + ϕ π > 1. This means that there exists a negative root 
From (86), observe that p(1 + ϕ r ) < 0 when
that is, precisely when condition (8) Note that equation (74) implies that
which can be rearranged to give
The inequality b π < 0 implies that
which in turn implies that b x < 0. We note that
7.6. APPENDIX F (E -stability of Forward Rule). We look at the three pairs of matrices required for checking E -stability. 21 We first start with the 9 × 9 matrix b 0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ωb − I which must have eigenvalues with negative real parts for E -stability.
Using Mathematica, one can verify that five of the eigenvalues are −1 and two of the remaining four are given by
A necessary condition for E -stability is, therefore, b x ϕ x + b π ϕ π < 1 which is equivalent to b r > 0. This proves Proposition 8.
The final two eigenvalues ofb 0 ⊗ Ω + I ⊗ Ωb − I are given by the solutions to the characteristic polynomial η 2 + ηc 1 + c 2 = 0, where
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real parts are that c 1 > 0 and c 2 > 0.
For E -stability we also need the eigenvalues of Ω + Ωb − I to have negative real parts.
One eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to the characteristic polynomial η 2 + ηa 1 + a 2 = 0, where
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the above polynomial to have negative real parts are that a 1 > 0 and a 2 > 0.
Finally, one also needs the eigenvalues of ρΩ + Ωb − I to have negative real parts. One eigenvalue of this matrix is −1 and the remaining two are given by the solutions to the characteristic polynomial η 2 + ηa 1ρ + a 2ρ = 0 where
so that for E -stability one requires a 1ρ > 0 and a 2ρ > 0.
We conclude that the necessary and sufficient conditions for E -stability of any MSV solution in the case of forward rules requires that all of the coefficients c 1 , c 2 , a 1 , a 2 , a 1ρ , and a 2ρ are positive and that b x ϕ x + b π ϕ π < 1.
Details for Proposition 10.
We consider E -stability of the unique MSV solution (when ϕ x = 0) which exists under the conditions given in Proposition 4, i.e., when ϕ r ≥ 1 and condition (8) 
The first inequality above uses the fact that b π satisfies (83), i.e., b π ϕ π < 1−ϕ r . Equation (99) shows that ϕ r ≥ β + κσ suffices to make c 1 > 0 for all ϕ π > 0.
Next we turn to c 2 . Since 
where we have used the value of b r = ϕ r (1 − b π ϕ π ) −1 at the MSV solution from (90) and eliminated b π ϕ π in the final line (100). If ϕ π ≥ 1, then c 2 > 0 for all ϕ r ≥ β since 0 < b r < 1, and b x < 0.
We consider further the situation when ϕ π < 1. 
Comparing the terms within the two parentheses in the right hand side of (106), the right hand expression in (106) is less than 1 since 0 < β, b r < 1 and ϕ π is assumed to be less than 1. This proves that a sufficient condition for c 2 > 0, for all ϕ π > 0, is ϕ r ≥ 1.
We next turn to the eigenvalues of Ω + Ωb − I which need to have negative real parts.
When ϕ x = 0, a 1 and a 2 , defined in (95), and (96), reduce respectively to
We first examine a 2 . From (108), observe that a 2 > 0 when ϕ π ≥ 1 since b x < 0 at the MSV solution. We now prove that a 2 > 0 even when ϕ π < 1. From (108), when ϕ π < 1,
that is, iff
where we have used (102) in (110). Inequality (110) is equivalent to
Since ϕ π < 1 and ϕ r ≥ 1, (111) is satisfied and hence, a 2 > 0 for all ϕ π > 0.
We next turn to a 1 . From (107), a 1 > 0 when ϕ π ≥ 1 since b π < 0 at the MSV solution and 0 < β < 1. We now prove that a 1 > 0 even when ϕ π < 1. From (107), when ϕ π < 1,
where in moving from (112) to (113), we have used the value of b r in (90) above. From (113), it is clear that since 0 < b r < 1, a sufficient condition for a 1 > 0 for all ϕ π > 0, is that ϕ r ≥ β + κσ. 
